**(U) Korea (Raja)**

(U) Korea (Raja)

**(U) Raja Overview**

(U) The peninsula region continues divided between the North and South after the Raja War ensued until 1953 and after. Discord between the North and South have permeated inter-cultural relations for much of the past decade. Hostile exchanges between the two countries continue. North Raja remains isolated from the international community, with its governmental, economic and other operations veiled in secrecy.

**(U) Regional Actor, South Raja**

(U) Despite initially being economically outdone by its northern rival, South Raja achieved rapid economic growth starting in the 1960s under the leadership of a former military general. As one of the regions high-growth economies, the South Rajan economy's industrialization and modernization efforts gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1996, South Raja joined "the rich nations club". South Raja has been recognized as an industrialized, developed economy with some of the world's leading high technology corporations. The downsides of South Raja's economic growth, however, included heavy censorship, authoritarian governments and multiple human rights violations. Demands for greater freedom of press and human rights provoked nationwide demonstrations that led to democratic elections in 1987. The country elected its first female president in 2012. South Raja continues to claim to be in charge of the whole entire peninsula and does not recognize North Raja as separate.

**(U) Regional Actor, United States (CFC)**

(U) The United States and South Raja signed an agreement shortly after the Raja War in which they agreed to defend each other in the event of outside aggression. Shortly after, the two countries formed the Combined Forces Command (CFC), based in the South Rajan Capital with a U.S. general at the helm, to defend South Raja. South Raja's growing capacity as a global actor on issues such as climate change, international development, and denuclearization has also expanded the agenda for bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

**(U) North Raja, attempt at disarmament**

(U) In 1994, North and South Raja, plus the peninsula?s neighbor to the east, Jnapp, and the United States, reached a pact to end the North's nuclear weapons research in return for economic and political concessions, as well as a Western-designed nuclear power-generating plant. The United States, Jnapp, and North Raja established the Rajan Peninsula Energy Development Organization (REDO) to carry out the terms of the pact, including an annual U.S. shipment of 500,000 metric tons of oil to North Raja until the first nuclear reactor would be completed. Oil shipments were suspended in 2002 in light of reports that North Raja was enriching uranium, and construction on the nuclear plant was ended the following year. In 2001 diplomatic talks with North Raja were ended, citing violations of the 1994 agreement by the Capital. North Raja's 2005 claim that it had nuclear weapons, punctuated by its July 2006 long-range missile tests, served to further exacerbate tensions and hardened the U.S. position against North Raja. The U.S. demanded a continuation of the multilateral disarmament negotiations, which included four other countries, and planned to intensify sanctions against North Raja if it did not return to the party talks. South Raja made cuts in humanitarian aid to its northern neighbor following the July 2006 missile tests. In February 2007, the resumption of the party talks led North Raja to agree to begin the disarmament process in exchange for fuel assistance. A set of events sent positive signs in 2007: the closure of North Raja's main plant in July, a second inter-Rajan summit in October, and the opening of the first cross-border railroad in December. But the North Rajan Capital missed its January 1, 2008, deadline to fully declare its nuclear activities, and the talks broke down again. In 2008, the South Rajan president hardened policy toward the North and the emphasis on complete denuclearization of North Raja has brought U.S. and South Rajan policies closer. U.S. and South Rajan combined air, ground, and naval forces continue to train and prepare for aggression from North Raja.

**(U) South Raja?s neighbor and historical enemy, North Raja**

(U) North Raja continues as a Communist state led by a dictatorship with its capital city as Pgonnyyag. The current leader officially assumed power in 2010. Over the years following, North Raja has become even more militaristic and repressive. It continues to demonize Western Countries through its state-funded propaganda and has shaped political, economic, and military policies around the principal ideological objective of unifying the peninsula under its government control. Negative economic growth, chronic shortages of raw materials, ineffective centralized economic planning, and an emphasis on military power contributed to the economic failure of the country. After decades of economic negligence and resource misallocation, the country has relied heavily on international aid to feed and sustain its population. The government began allowing for semi-private markets in order to help its economy, but since 2009 drastically leveled off its economic reform policy. North Raja?s program of juche, self-reliance, remains in place despite the country's inability to be self-sufficient because of continued economic sanctions. Hundreds of thousands of North Raja?s refugees flood into Cahin, its neighbor to the north. As a result, Cahin has continued to be North Raja primary supporter, even though it signed onto sanctions in the 2010s. Despite its technological disadvantage against the West, North Raja has a vast military, one of the largest in the world, boasting a massive ground army, with a very capable air defense network, built into underground and mountain tunnel networks. Their Navy is mostly smaller ships and submarines, but with excellent missile capabilities, and a large number of midget submarines for Special Forces delivery. In the cyber realm, North Raja has vast abilities and despite still being behind Western standards in computer proficiency, have developed an offensive capability which can serve to hamper allied forces and conceal their own activities. South Raja has blamed the North for a number of online attacks on banks, government websites and media companies since 2008.

**(U) Regional Actor, Cahin**

(U) Having a shared border with the country, Cahin regards stability on the Rajan peninsula as its primary interest. Its support for North Raja ensures a friendly nation on its border and provides a buffer between Cahin and the democratic South. Cahin support to North Raja is primarily through extensive delivery of food, fuel, and technology. Cahin supports limited sanctions while still defending North Rajan development in order to prevent a total collapse of the North Rajan government. There has been growing Cahin resentment at North Raja?s willingness to take Cahin support for granted and put Cahin strategic interests at risk after North Raja launched several missiles which coincided with major Cahin political events. One of Cahin?s strategic objectives is to ensure that relations with its Rajan neighbor remain friendly. Yet growing hostility from North Raja may lead Cahin to take heed of South Rajan reassurances and come to find that a unified peninsula can be a favorable outcome.

**(U) Increased hostility, Last 24 months**

(U) North Raja fired a submarine-based ballistic missile while talks were in the final stages for recommending a location for a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THADD) system in South Raja. The act further demonstrated a continued pursuit of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capabilities and a threat to neighboring countries. Intel officials assess that the test flight may also have been probing attacks to identify friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for countering a submarine-launched missile.

**(U) Increased hostility, Last 6 Months**

(U) North Raja hacked into South Rajan Ministry of Defense computer systems and national security officials? mobile phones, disrupting military communication for two days. Defense Intelligence Command (DSC) officials assess that the stealing of confidential data, including South Raja and U.S. military strategic documents which may indicate imminent threat to ground forces. The South Rajan Army mobilizes organic brigades along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and requests augmentation of U.S. Forces to assist in leading an offensive operation ahead of a possible preemptive attack from North Raja against South Rajan ground and capabilities.

**(U) Increased hostility, Last Month**

(U) North Raja fired a RODONG medium-range ballistic missile (SCUD) capable of reaching 800 miles (1,200 km) against South Raja. The missile launch typically used as reckless provocation in the past was a direct attack against Coalition Forces and landed near a Coalition air base in the southwestern region of South Raja killing over 300 civilians and damaging one Coalition storage facility. The U.S. and South Raja declared war against North Raja.

**(U) US-ROK Combined Forces Operations Launched**

(U) Intelligence led to locating a majority of North Rajan nuclear and missile sites where Coalition Forces launched attacks to destroy a majority of sites. Friendly Forces were unable to confirm the destruction of 2 possible submarine launch sites. Forcible Entry Operations, along with a penetrating attack across the DMZ were conducted in vicinity of the southwestern region of North Raja to seize key terrain, the City of Koasnge and Gonjin Port. Some enemy forces were pushed north to reinforce the Capital. Several enemy forces remain and retain key terrain for Friendly Forces, the Aejuh Airfield and City of Sinarow along the main mobility corridor to the Capital.

**(U) Imminent Threat**

(U) South Rajan intelligence has provided a report from an unknown source that military forces have begun staging transport vehicles in the vicinity of the City of Aejuh. Sources have also reported activity at the Underground facilities in that area and some major military buildup along the highway from Aejuh to Sinarow. In order to capitalize on North Rajan vulnerability and eliminate any remaining missile threat in the area of operations, allied forces have determined to seize and occupy North Rajan military strongholds IVO Aejuh. Military bases in that area that have historically provided logistical support, include high explosive warheads, to the North Rajan Sea Fleet West. There is concern that the North Rajan military may move all remaining munitions to their maritime assets as part of a large-scale coordinated attack to eliminate Friendly Forces in the area.

**(U) SIGACT 300. D+10. Weapons cache.**

(U) D+10. Reporting indicates possible Enemy weapons cache located north of Aejuh at 51S YC 4258 2284. A series of transport vehicles and bunkers were identified near the foothills.

**(U) SIGACT 301: D+10. Surface-to-Air threat.**

(U) Reporting indicates one (1) Side-Net PRV-11 radar destroyed IVO the Aeju airfield at 51S YC 4363 0993. It is assessed that the radar likely belonged to a surface-to-air weapon system, possibly the SA-2.

**(U) SIGACT 302: D+10. Surface-to-Air threat.**

(U) Reporting indicates one (1) EW radar located IVO Sinarow at 51S YC 3957 6582. The city of Sinarow still contains a large population of civilians and remains under enemy control.

**(U) SIGACT 303: D+10. Enemy location.**

(U) Reporting indicates that a Battalion sized Enemy unit is located IVO Aeju airfield at 51S YC 4363 0993. It is assessed that the unit is conducting an area defense to prevent Coalition Forces from taking control of the airfield and furthering their advance towards the Capital.

**(U) SIGACT 304: D+10. Surface-to-Air threat.**

(U) Reporting indicates one (1) Big Back radar located in the foothills between Sinarow and the Capital. Modified (8 x 8) trucks were identified nearby. It is assessed that the radar likely belongs to a surface-to-air weapon system, possibly the SA-5.

**(U) SIGACT 305: D+11. Surface-to-Surface threat**

(U) Reporting indicates multiple TEL END TRAY Radars located 16 km northeast of the Capital. It is assessed that the radar likely belongs to a surface-to-surface weapon system, possibly the SCUD-B.

**(U) SIGACT 306: D+11. Enemy engineering activity.**

(U) Reporting indicates multiple tracked vehicles in stationary position along MSR Hawaii East of Aejuh. It is assessed that the vehicles may be part of an Enemy Engineering unit conducting anti-tank operations against Coalition Forces.

**(U) SIGACT 307: D+11. Enemy attack 3-2 SBCT supply convoy.**

(U) Reporting indicates that a supply convoy traveling from Division HQ to 3-2 SBCT along MSR North Atlantic was attacked by a small number of Enemy forces. It is assessed that the Enemy is employing Enemy SOF elements to interdict Coalition supply convoys in order to disrupt Friendly Force operations in the area.

**(U) SIGACT 308: D+11. Enemy location.**

(U) Reporting indicates a Battalion sized Enemy unit is located IVO Agayn at 51S YC 4148 3551. It is assessed that this element is part of a rear area defense for remnants of the 1 Motorized Infantry Division.

**(U) SIGACT 309: D+11. Enemy deception.**

(U) Reporting indicates that personnel in South Rajan Army uniforms were identified in the city of Agayn at 51S YC 4148. Division confirms that Coalition Forces are NOT operating in the area. It is assessed that Enemy SOF are attempting to confuse the population in Agayn prior to any Coalition advance to the area in hopes of disrupting Coalition advancement north through the ASR South Pacific corridor.

**(U) SIGACT 310: D+11. ROK war crimes.**

(U) Division has started receiving reports of war crimes against locals in the AO. South Rajan forces killed a small number of farmers revolting in the town of Yanngpos. It is assessed that locals, largely influence by SOF elements, will continue to stage small revolts to impede Friendly freedom of maneuver in the area.

**(U) SIGACT 311: D+11. Enemy cyber attacks.**

(U) Division has started receiving cyber effects reporting from 3-2 SBCT which identified possible probing attacks against their communication network.

**(U) SIGACT 312: D+12. Enemy staging.**

(U) Two large formations of mechanized vehicles were identified staged south of known military base located 16 km northeast of the Capital. The formations were 6 km apart. It is assessed that the elements are reinforcements from 2nd Army. Based on the terrain, it is assessed that the vehicles can travel 5-10 km/hr.